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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, W. AVERELL HARRIMAN AND  
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, SOVIET EMBASSY, ON JULY 13, 1977

I called on Ambassador Dobrynin this morning at 11 o'clock, at my request, as Marshall Shulman had told me he was leaving for Moscow today. He told me that he just didn't know what countries would be invited to the Sixtieth Anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7. He did not know whether it would be limited to Socialist countries or whether we and other Western countries would be included. He promised to let me know as soon as he could find out. I also asked him to give me his judgment on the kind of delegation that would be most appreciated--for example, whether it should be from Congress or a group of distinguished Americans from different backgrounds.

I told him that I felt sure that President Carter wanted to meet with Brezhnev and asked him how Brezhnev would feel about it. He said that he felt that Brezhnev wanted it even more than Carter, but he did not want it to be a fizzle. Brezhnev would consider some plausible results would have to come out of it, rather than just the two of them getting to know each other. SALT, of course, would be the best; and he did not have any other suggestions of any other agreements that appeared to be in the offing. He agreed to let me know if he had any ideas.

I asked him how he thought relations could be improved, and referred to the Soviet press' criticism of President Carter. He said that these were

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all reactions to things that come from this side; and he enumerated some of them, including things that Marshall Shulman told me last night. He said that we had not informed them sufficiently in advance on the radically new *Salt* proposals that Vance made in March. They had only been informed that something of that kind was coming along. In the old days of Kissinger, these things were worked out before the visit, so that things could be sewed up when he or the President arrived. He wished we could go back to that sort of procedures.

He said that the Soviets could not take exceptions <sup>to</sup> on Human Rights *statements* but wish that ~~he~~ <sup>the President</sup> would stay out of the details that had to do with individual citizens that they considered had broken their laws. The announcements from the White House are always with the American opinion in view, with very little if any consideration for the effect abroad. He referred to Harold Brown's statement that we would have Cruise Missiles whether we had an *SALT* agreement or not. He knew this was for Congress, but it was certainly misunderstood in Moscow.

I emphasized the need for the two men getting together so some of these things could be ironed out. He was equally strong for a meeting, provided it would not be considered by the public as a flop and pictured the kind of publicity that would come out of a meeting *and that is...*

He was very friendly and urged me to send word to him through his office if I had any information that I thought would be of value in improving

relations. ~~He was quite sarcastic about Doon's handling of the message to be given to Brezhnev from the President.~~

He said he would be back on August 27th and that would give him a couple of weeks time to smooth out the preparations for Gromyko and Vance's meeting on September 8th and 9th provided we were willing to do so. Of course Dobrynin wants to do everything he conceivably can to improve relations and particularly the SALT agreement.